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MARKET INCENTIVES FOR RECYCLING - THE TAX 
CREDIT AND PRODUCT CHARGE COMPARED 
Kevin C. Devine* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal assistance to state and municipal solid waste manage-
ment agencies is a phenomenon of recent origin. Traditionally the 
task of waste management fell squarely within local and state juris-
diction. During the last several decades, however, the disastrous 
results of an historically laissez-faire approach to waste manage-
ment have become apparent. Today, one need only consider the 
sprawl of the town dump and the rapid depletion of national re-
source reserves to appreciate the waste and mismanagement that 
occurs. The disjointed, and often shortsighted efforts of local agen-
cies have failed to effect a waste policy upon which the nation can 
rely. Yet the need for a reliable waste policy is clear. 
The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 19651 was the initial federal 
response to the solid waste problem. The Act recognized the necess-
ity of stimulating additional materials recycling2 and established a 
framework for both financial and technical assistance to local and 
state agencies for development of resource recovery and solid waste 
disposal programs.3 A federal recycling policy had come of age. 
This article will explore recent congressional proposals in two 
closely related areas: materials recycling and waste reduction ef-
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3251-54{O, 3256-59 (1965)), as amended, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795. 
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 3251(a)(5) (1965). 
3 Resource recovery refers to the recovery of energy and materials from the solid waste 
stream. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
THIRD REPORT To CONGRESS - RESOURCE RECOVERY AND WASTE REDUCTION 1 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as EPA, THIRD REPORT]. 
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forts. As used in this article, "recycling" means "the recovery of 
specific reprocessed secondary materials."4 Thus, for example, the 
reuse of a returnable beverage container does not constitute recy-
cling unless that container has been broken down and remade. 
Waste reduction, on the other hand, refers to "prevention of waste 
at its source,"5 and is generally accomplished through extended 
product lives or less materials-intensive product designs.' Reuse of 
a returnable bottle would, therefore, constitute waste reduction. 
The first section of this article reviews the seriousness of the solid 
waste problem. Following is a brief discussion of federal action to 
date, and a comparison of two recent recycling proposals: the Senate 
Finance Committee's tax credit for recycling,7 and the House Com-
merce Committee's national product charge.s 
II. THE SOLID WASTE PROBLEM AND FEDERAL RESPONSES 
A. The Solid Waste Problem 
The United States is supported by an industrial economy hungry 
for raw materials. During 1971, this nation consumed upwards of 5 
billion tons of virgin materials.9 Estimates vary, but it appears that 
total domestic solid waste production for the same year reached well 
over 4 billion tons. to This article focuses on those solid wastes that 
comprise the bulk of the secondary materials market,l1 i.e., post-
consumer municipal solid wastes, and industrial "home" and 
"prompt" scraps. Post-consumer wastes are those solid wastes dis-
• [d. 
• [d. at 4. 
• See id. The phrase 'materials-intensive' refers to the quantity of basic materials con-
sumed during manufacture. 
7 H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2006 (1976) (unenacted draft) [hereinafter cited as § 
2006), reprinted in TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, As REPORTED BY SENATE FtNANCE, JUNE 10, 1976, 
27 FED. TAXES (P-H) EXTRA ISSUE, Supp. LVll, 184-86 [hereinafter cited as SENATE FtNANCE 
§ 2006]; see also REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FtNANCE ON H.R. 10612, [1976] 28 FED. 
TAXES (P-H) Supp. LVIT § 2 at 575-78 [hereinafter cited as REPORT, § 2006]. 
• H.R. 14496, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 306 (1976) (unenacted House Commerce Comm. draft 
of the Solid Waste Utilization Act, § 306) (on file in offices of ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS) 
[hereinafter cited as Draft § 306]. 
• OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
FIRST REPORT To CONGRESS - RESOURCE RECOVERY AND SOURCE REDUCTION (1973) reprinted in 
EPA LEGAL COMPILATION, SOLID WASTE, Supp. IT 43 (1974) [hereinafter cited as EPA, FIRST 
REPORT]. 
10 [d. at 44. Solid waste is a term of general application, and includes solid materials 
discarded during industrial, commercial, agricultural, and residential activities. 
" The secondary materials market is the market wherein recycled materials are traded. 
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carded by ultimate consumers, either residential or commercial. I2 
Industrial home scraps are created during processing activities and 
typically consist of defective, but reusable batches of basic materi-
als. 13 Prompt scraps, on the other hand, result during fabrication 
activites and generally consist of excess trimmings or shavings. 14 
Specific measurements of home and prompt scraps produced and 
consumed by domestic industry are difficult to gather, and once 
found are subject to gross misinterpretation. Indeed, many indus-
tries only retain records of the scrap they consume and make no 
distinction between materials purchased from a municipal source 
and those acquired from a prompt or home scrap reserve. 15 However, 
both home and prompt scraps are currently recycled at close to 90% 
of total production. 18 Thus, absent any federal incentive, industry 
has found it quite profitable to consume nearly all of its own solid 
wastes. 
Unfortunately this is not the case with post-consumer municipal 
wastes. To date, the recycling of these materials has not proven 
economically attractive to domestic industry. As a result, post-
consumer wastes represent the major weakness in the secondary 
materials market. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
estimates that during 1973 domestic production of post-consumer 
wastes exceeded 144 million tons. 17 Only 7% of that total reached the 
market to be recycled. 18 The remainder was disposed of at a cost to 
local government of approximately $3.5 billion.19 Recent updates 
suggest that no significant change in total post-consumer waste cre-
ation occurred between 1973 and 1975.20 Nevertheless, this stagna-
tion is probably temporary in nature and is likely the result of the 
.2 EPA, THIRD REpORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
'3 Anderson & Spiegelman, Tax Policy and Secondary Material Use 10 (1976) (manuscript 
to be published in J. ENVT'L EcoN. & MANAG'T, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Anderson & 
Spiegelman). 
" [d. at 10-U . 
•• Phone conversation with Jerry Scharf, Assistant Executive Vice-President, National 
Association of Recycling Industries (Oct. 29, 1976). 
II This is the generally quoted figure, though perhaps premised upon logic rather than 
empirical study. Phone conversation with Frank Smith, Economist, Resource Recovery Divi-
sion, EPA, Wash., D.C. (Oct. 5, 1976). 
17 EPA, THIRD REPORT, supra note 3, at 9. Note that this figure fails to include auto hulks 
or demolition wastes. [d. at 8 . 
•• [d. 
It [d. at 11. 
211 Phone conversation with Frank Smith, Economist, Resource Recovery Division, EPA, 
Wash., D.C. (Oct. 5, 1976). 
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recent economic recession. 21 Although current economic uncertain-
ties make accurate prediction of future trends difficult, the EPA 
estimates that by 1990 domestic output of post-consumer wastes 
will increase to 225 million tons per year. 22 
Though the recycling rates for industrial wastes remain high, the 
recovery rates of the major components of the post-consumer mu-
nicipal waste stream are declining. Senator Gravel, estimates cur-
rent recycling rates of 16.5% for paper, 1.6% for metals, 2.1% for 
glass, and 0% for both plastics and textiles. 23 The question to be 
asked, then, is why the recovery rates are so poor? 
Study of the secondary materials market indicates that the major 
problem is one of economics. In particular, many secondary materi-
als are not competitively priced with their counterpart virgin mate-
rials. 24 A variety of factors create wide pricing variances through the 
inflation of secondary materials' prices and the artificial deflation 
of virgin materials' costs. In other words, these factors tend to keep 
the cost of recycled materials too high, and the cost of virgin materi-
als too low. 
Two classes of factors contribute to this problem. First, there are 
certain economic realities; i.e., plant siting and technology, procure-
ment costs, and present day recycling technologies. Second, are 
certain historical and political policy factors, such as freight rate 
scheduling, current tax incentives for the consumption of virgin 
materials, and the municipal financing of solid waste management 
costs through the general tax system. 
Plant siting and procurement costs are interdependent and call 
for simultaneous examination. Traditionally both plant siting and 
technology were aimed at the exploitation of virgin material 
sources. 25 Clearly, where the industry site is close to an available 
source of raw material, the cost of those materials need not reflect 
the same high costs of collection, separation, processing, and long 
distance transportation which inflate secondary materials prices. It 
21 [d. 
22 EPA, THIRD REPORT, supra note 3, at 10. 
23 122 CONGo REc. S13413 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Gravel). 
" "It is very difficult to generalize about the degree to which competition between second-
ary and virgin materials exists .... [Nevertheless]' there are certain situations in which 
secondary and virgin materials openly compete at the process level or in the final product 
marketplace." OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, SECOND REPORT To CONGRESS - RESOURCE RECOVERY AND SOURCE REDUCTION 23 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as EPA, SECOND REPORT]. 
25 EPA, FIRST REPORT, supra note 9, at 47. 
1976] RECYCLING INCENTIVES 673 
is estimated, for example, that transportation costs alone contribute 
in excess of 30% to the delivered price of scrap iron. 26 In the steel 
industry, where scrap iron is generally an acceptable substitute for 
raw pig iron, procurement costs for the scrap substitute typically 
run $6.50 per ton greater than that for the raw pig.27 Thus, to the 
extent that plant siting amplifies waste transportation costs, it acts 
to frustrate increased recycling efforts. 
The economics of recycling is further determined by the availabil-
ity of recycling technology to municipalities. 28 To the municipality, 
costs are of prime importance, and technology governs costS.29 As 
recycling technology is still in its infancy, many municipalities will 
avoid risking large capital expenditures until experience offers pre-
ferred methods and techniques.3u Despite these risks, resource recov-
ery systems are being built. In 1976, seven or eight cities in the 
United States had operational plants; eight or nine plants were in 
construction; and thirty more facilities were in either the late plan-
ning or design stage.31 Nevertheless, the EPA indicates that, "[a]t 
the current implementation rate recovery efforts probably will fall 
considerably short of what could be achieved. "32 
Historical and political factors also tend to constrain additional 
recycling efforts. Freight rates, for example, can significantly in-
crease the delivered price of secondary materials. Despite frequent 
denials by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),33 allega-
tions of freight rate discrimination against secondary materials 
persist.34 In 1974, the EPA reported to Congress that certain second-
" EPA, SECOND REpORT, supra note 24, at 24. 
27 EPA, FIRST REPORT, supra note 9, at 54. 
2. See EPA, THIRD REPORT, supra note 3, at 63-74 (comparison of five resource recovery 
techniques). 
2. "Economic cost is a key factor in local government decisions to implement large-scale 
resource recovery plants." [d. at 63. 
30 EPA, THIRD REpORT, supra note 3, at xvi. 
31 Environmental Protection Agency Transition Papers To Incoming Carter Administration 
on Areas of Agency Jurisdiction, [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1288, 1307. 
32 Id. 
33 In August, 1976, the ICC submitted a draft environmental impact statement, alleging 
no significant impact of freight rates on the volume of materials recycling. [1976] 7 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 643 . 
.. Perhaps best known in this regard is Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dure (SCRAP) v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974). In SCRAP, plaintiff law 
students and professors claimed that the ICC failed adequately to address the potential 
effects of rate increases on the recycling of solid wastes. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs, 
finding the ICC's environmental impact statement wanting, and required a moratorium on 
rate increases pending further investigation by the agency. See generally The Relationship 
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ary materials contribute in greater proportion to railroad profits 
than their counterpart virgin materials.3s Although no consistent 
pattern of freight discrimination was alleged, the report cited evi-
dence of rate discrimination in the cases of scrap iron and steel, 
glass cullet, and reclaimed rubber.3ft The Institute of Scrap Iron and 
Steel (ISIS) has made the same charges. The ISIS estimates that 
"an additional 144 million tons of ferrous scrap would have been 
recycled during the past ten years if the ICC had corrected the 
discriminatory rate structure."37 The ICC contends, however, that 
freight rates have no significant impact on materials recycling and 
cites supply and demand inelasticity as the controlling factors of 
recycling volume.3s Although market analysis supports the ICC's 
premise that supply and demand are inelastic for many recycla-
bles,39 such a premise does not rebut the evidence ofrate discrimina-
tion. Clearly further study of the problem is warranted; perhaps on 
an inter-agency basis rather than by the ICC alone. 
Present tax subsidies allowed for virgin materials use also contrib-
ute to price differences between virgin and secondary materials.40 
The Internal Revenue Code provides depletion allowances for the 
exploitation of natural resources,41 and capital gains treatment for 
profits realized from standing timber sales.42 As the combined sav-
Between Substantive and Procedural Review under NEPA: A Case Study of SCRAP v. U.S., 
4 ENV. AFF. 157 (1975). 
3.' See EPA, SECOND REpORT, supra note 24, at 19-24. 
31 Id. Ocean freight rates are also suspect, with studies showing up to 95% greater revenue 
contribution per ton by wastepaper over virgin pulpwood. Id. at 23. 
37 PHOENIX QUARTERLY, Fall, 1976, at 1 (publication of the Institute of Scrap Iron and Steel, 
Inc.). 
'" [19761 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 643. In February, 1977, the ICC reaffirmed its finding of no 
significant impact, yet concluded that certain freight rates were "unjust and unreasonable." 
Consequently, the ICC ordered railroads to cut freight rates for copper matte, zinc dross, 
aluminum residues, certain nonferrous metal scraps, cullet, and ashes. [1977] ENVIR. REp. 
(BNA) 1543. 
31 See text at note 94, infra. 
,. See Federal Tax Policy Has Only Modest Impact on Recycling, Environmental Law 
Institute Study Concludes, 6 E.L.R. 10041 (1976) [hereinafter cited as E.L.1. Study]; EPA, 
FIRST REPORT, supra note 9, at 48; 122 CONGo REc. S13411 (daily ed., Aug. 4, 1976) (remarks 
of Sen. Gravel). 
" I.R.C. § 613. Percentage depletion allowances are business related deductions allowed 
against gross income from natural resource development. Unlike many deductions, the deple-
tion deduction is taken as a percentage of gross income, thus the taxpayer could foreseeably 
deduct more than his actual basis in the property. Percentage depletion is available only for 
those materials listed in § 613. 
n Id. §§ 631(a), 1231(a). Section 631(a) allows timber owners the option to elect capital 
gains treatment for their cut timber. Thus, the taxpayer may elect preferential tax treatment 
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ings by virgin materials producers from these provisions is in excess 
of $1 billion per year,43 a substantial incentive for the exploitation 
of virgin materials is maintained, possibly to the detriment of the 
secondary materials market. "To the degree that these benefits re-
duce virgin material prices, they could result in overconsumption of 
virgin resources and act to inhibit the use of recycled materials."H 
Another factor influencing cost differences between potentially 
competitive virgin and secondary materials is the practice of financ-
ing municipal waste management through the general tax system.45 
This method of cost distribution disregards the actual materials 
consumption of the consumer and forces each taxpayer to pay an 
equal percentage of the hidden costs of waste collection, separation 
and disposal. In other words, this policy fails to internalize these 
costs into the price of the product containing the virgin materials,48 
It is, in effect, an indirect subsidy for virgin materials use,47 artifi-
cially depressing virgin materials prices. Because secondary materi-
als necessarily reflect these collection and disposal costs, existing 
price differences are further exaggerated. Again, to the extent virgin 
material prices are held artifically low, recycling efforts are 
thwarted. 
In sum, several economic and policy factors tend to discourage 
increased recycling efforts. Their reevaluation should prove a valua-
ble tool to legislators concerned with stimulating the secondary 
materials market. As evidenced by the spate of recently proposed48 
for gains or losses incurred. In general, capital gains taxes are lower than taxes levied on 
ordinary income . 
.. TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE ON H.R. 10612, 94th CONG., 2d SESS. 
19 (Comm. Print, July 20, 1976) (statement of Sen. G. Hart) [hereinafter cited as FINANCE 
COMM. TESTIMONY]. See BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T, FISCAL YEAR 1978, SPECIAL ANALYSES, 
Special Analysis F. 128 (fiscal 1977 cost estimated to be $1.7 billion) . 
.. EPA, SECOND REPORT, supra note 24, at xi. 
" See Anderson, Public Policies Toward The Use of Scrap Materials 2 (1976) (manuscript 
to be published in AM. ECON. REv., 1977) [hereinafter cited as Anderson, Public Policies]; 
Skinner Recommends Tax Subsidies, Tightening Environmental Regulations, [1976] ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 79 [hereinafter cited as Skinner]; 122 CONGo REC. S13412 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) 
(letter from Russell Train, Administrator, EPA, read by Sen. Gravel). 
" In this context, cost internalization refers to the forced inclusion of external costs into 
the ultimate price of the product. 
" See letter from Russell Train, Administrator, EPA, in 122 CONGo REc. S13412 (daily ed. 
Aug. 4, 1976) . 
.. See, e.g., H.R. 12536, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONGo REC. H467 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1974) 
(freight rate discrimination and secondary materials); H.R. 12537, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 
CONGo REC. H467 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1974) (regulation of non-recyclables); H.R. 4451, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONGo REC. H1463 (daily ed. March 6, 1975) (tax free bonds for resource 
recovery facilities); H.R. 404, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONGo REc. H180 (daily ed., Jan. 16, 
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and enacted recycling incentives,48 Congress has begun to respond. 
B. Review of Federal Response to Date 
Federal responses to the growing solid waste problem take a vari-
ety of forms. For analytical purposes, four general, yet overlapping 
categories of legislation will be discussed. 
1) Financial assistance to state and local agencies: 
The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965,50 and its most recent 
amendment, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976,51 are the mainstays of this first category. These statutes pro-
vide financial and technical assistance to eligible solid waste man-
agement agencies,52 "for the demonstration of resource recovery sys-
tems or for the construction of new or improved solid waste disposal 
facilities."53 Other congressional proposals in this category differ 
mostly as to form and amount of assistance,54 but generally recog-
nize the inability of local governments to finance large-scale projects 
on their own. The principal limitation on the effectiveness of these 
efforts is that they focus only upon local, state, and interstate recov-
ery systems, and thus their impact is solely upon the supply-side, 
as opposed to the demand-side, of the secondary materials market. 
The EPA has suggested that "[t]he most efficient incentive for 
materials recovery would be one which results in the creation of new 
demand by industry for secondary materials."55 Therefore, until 
both supply and demand are stimulated, the benefits of federal 
expenditures for supply-side technology improvement may not be 
fully realized. 
1975) (printing of the Congressional Record on recycled paper); S. 1593, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 
119 CONGo REC. 12411 (1973) (tax incentives for recycling and materials regulation) . 
.. See generally text at notes 49-68, infra. 
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-54(f), 3256-59 (1965), as amended, Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 . 
• , Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-54(f), 3256-59 
(1965). 
52 Note that private profit-making organizations are ineligible for assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 
3258(b) (1965). 
53 [d. § 3254(b). 
" For example, whether to provide grants on a percentage of cost basis, as in the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251 et seq. (1965); or to provide below market interest 
rate loans, as proposed by Sen. Moss in S. 1593, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONGo REc. 12411 
(1973) . 
.. EPA, FIRST REpORT, supra note 9, at 63. 
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2) Reevaluation of federal regulatory schemes: 
Progress is apparent in this second category of federal response. 
Section 204 of the Railroad Revitilization and Regulatory Reform 
Act of 197656 directed the ICC to investigate the possible effects of 
its freight rate policies on the volume of materials recycling. As 
previously mentioned, the ICC has denied any significant impactY 
The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) labeling regulations have 
also been subjected to congressional scrutiny for discrimination 
against secondary materials. Section 383 of the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act prohibits the FTC from requiring "any container 
of recycled oil to also bear a label. .. which connotes less than sub-
stantial equivalence of such recycled oil with new oil. "58 
In another area of concern, the EPA recently published new regu-
lations governing the sale of returnable beverage containers on fed-
eral facilities. 59 These guidelines, though mandatory for federal de-
partments and agencies, may also serve as recommendations to 
state and local governments. In addition, guidelines have been is-
sued for the establishment of resource recovery facilities on many 
federal installations.60 Several agencies are currently experimenting 
with these guidelines to determine the feasibility of full compli-
ance. 61 
3) Waste reduction proposals: 
Waste reduction techniques seek to alter societal consumption 
patterns by establishing either product design or material content 
standards.52 The most widely recognized product design technique 
is the so called "bottle bill," or mandatory deposit legislation.63 
During the 94th Congress, Senator Hatfield introduced a national 
mandatory deposit bill as an amendment to the Solid Waste Utili-
zation Act. 64 Although the proposal suffered a resounding defeat, 
" Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 40 (1976) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1). 
57 See notes 33, 38, supra. 
" Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 941 (1975) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6363(e)(2)) . 
.. 41 Fed. Reg. 41203 (1976) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 244). 
on 41 Fed. Reg. 41209 (1976) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 245). 
" [19761 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1026. 
" EPA, THIRD REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. 
" E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1521 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1976) . 
.. S. 2150, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The Solid Waste Utilization Act is the precurser of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L: No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976), 
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-54(f), 3256-59 (1965). 
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due primarily to the lobbying efforts of the bottling industry,65 there 
are plans to reintroduce the bill during the 95th Congress.66 At the 
state level, bottle bill legislation receives continued exposure: since 
1971, mandatory deposit bills have been introduced in 50 state legis-
latures.67 Seven states currently enjoy laws partially or fully regulat-
ing the manufacture of beverage containers.88 
Another proposed waste reduction technique is the "product 
charge" concept.89 The product charge will be fully discussed in Part 
IV of this article. 
4) Market incentives for recycling: 
Market incentives for recycling are designed to stimulate in-
creased economic competition between secondary and virgin mate-
rials. Some market incentives, like the proposed tax credit to recy-
clers,70 focus only on demand for secondary materials. Others, like 
the product charge,11 focus upon both demand and supply. Regard-
less of the approach taken, the result is increased cash flow within 
the secondary materials market. The question remains, however, 
whether the tax credit or the product charge will result in increased 
materials recycling. The two approaches discussed below are both 
typical and timely, thus providing an attractive framework for anal-
ysis of market incentives in general. 
ITI. THE TAX CREDIT: SECTION 2006 
Section 2006 of the Senate Finance Committee's draft of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 proposed a tax credit to recyclers, "for purchases 
of recyclable solid waste materials."72 In offering the measure, the 
Committee's express intent was the stimulation of "a steadily in-
I. As reported in Serrin, Judgment on No-Returns, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1976, § 3, at I, 
col. 5 . 
.. Id . 
• 7 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL REpORT 96 (1975) . 
.. Five states have laws currently codified: OR. REv. STAT. §§ 459.810 et seq. (1975); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1521 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-16C-
1 et seq. (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116F.06 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 24380 et seq. (West Supp. 1976). Two states, Maine and Michigan, recently adopted 
mandatory deposit legislation after ballot referenda. [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 980. 
II A product charge resembles a special excise tax, "designed to provide an incentive for 
decreased material and product use." EPA, THIRD REpORT, supra note 3, at xii. For a discus-
sion of product charges, see text PART IV, infra. 
7. SENATE FINANCE § 2006, supra note 7. 
71 Draft § 306, supra note 8. 
TI REpORT, § 2006, supra note 7, at 576. 
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creasing amount of recycling,"i3 and a concomitant reduction in the 
amount of municipal waste requiring final disposal. Thus, the tax 
credit was advanced as a "tax incentive" for increased consumption 
of recyclable solid waste materials. 74 
The tax credit a recycler would receive under § 2006 is a function 
of both the type and the amount of material being recycled. Differ-
ent materials yield different credits to the purchaser. Purchasers of 
ferrous and nonferrous scrap75 receive a credit equal to one half the 
percentage depletion allowed those materials by the Internal Reve-
nue Code. 76 Purchasers of wastepaper and textile scrap are allowed 
a ten percent credit, and scrap glass and plastic purchasers, a five 
percent credit.n In an attempt to assure actual increases in recycling 
efforts, the Finance Committee limited the credit's availability to 
recycling purchases "in excess of the [recycler's] base period 
amount. "78 
A recycler's base period amount is calculated as 75 percent of 
average annual purchases over the preceding three year period.79 
The basis of the credit formula is, therefore, a three-year moving 
average, and the recycler is entitled to a credit for purchases in 
excess of an historical average.80 To avoid unnecessary disruption 
and a tax windfall81 the credit was to be phased in over a three year 
period, that is, the credit would be limited to 25% of the calculated 
amount in the first year, and to 50% in the second.82 
An example should clarify the calculation of the credit formula. 
Assume a glass recycler in operation since 1974. If purchases were 
as follows: 100 tons in 1974, 120 tons in 1975, and 140 tons in 1976; 
then the 1977 base period amount would be 90 tons (75% of 120).83 
If 1977 purchases also equalled 140 tons, the recycler would be eligi-
13 [d. 
" See text at note 87, infra. 
" Gold, silver, platinum, and other precious metals are not included. SENATE FINANCE § 
2006, supra note 7, at § 2006(g)(3)(A). 
" I.R.C. § 613. 
77 SENATE FINANCE § 2006, supra note 7, at § 2006(g)(2)(A). 
" [d. § 2006(g)(1) (emphasis added). 
" "(B) Permanent base period. - For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1980, 
the base period amount of a taxpayer is 75 percent of the average annual amount of recycling 
purchases of the taxpayer for the three preceeding taxable years." [d. § 2006(g)( 4)(B). 
'" REPORT, § 2006, supra note 7, at 576. 
" In this context, windfall refers to an undesired subsidy for an activity already profitably 
pursued. 
" SENATE FINANCE § 2006, supra note 7, at § 2006(g)(6). 
" In calculating the 1978 base period amount, 1974 purchases would be ignored. 
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ble for a credit of 5% of his cost for 50 (140-90) tons of glass cullet. 
The phase in provision limits the recycler's credit in this first year 
to 25% of the calculated amount, or 12.5 tons. 
The Finance Committee's report on § 2006 defines eligible solid 
waste materials as "materials which must have been used by an 
ultimate consumer and have no significant value or utility except 
as waste."M In addition, manufacturers are included in the defini-
tion of ultimate consumers, and "fabrication wastes" (prompt 
scraps) are defined as post-consumer solid wastes. 85 Prompt scraps 
are not eligible if reused by the initial fabricator; only the purchas-
ing recycler of the prompt scrap is entitled to the credit.88 
The Treasury estimates that § 2006 would have resulted in a loss 
of approximately $345 million in revenue per year by 1981, revenue 
which otherwise would have been collected by the Internal Revenue 
Service.87 In contrast to direct congressional expenditures which cre-
ate an outflow of treasury funds, a tax credit results in an inability 
to collect revenue otherwise due.88 In either instance the conse-
quences are the same: a reduction in treasury funds. 8u Thus, tax 
credits are a type of "tax expenditure."uo More precisely, the tax 
credit for recycling is a "tax incentive," a subcategory of tax ex-
penditures, because its very purpose is to induce a behavioral re-
sponse within the recycling market.UI For analytical purposes, there-
fore, the tax credit is simply a government assistance program ad-
ministered through the federal income tax system.U2 For this reason, 
•• REPORT, § 2006, supra note 7, at 577. 
~, Id. Thus, prompt scraps are eligible for the credit, while home scraps remain ineligible. 
Id. For definitions see text at notes 12-14, supra . 
.. Report, § 2006, supra note 7, at 577. Clearly, the monitoring of this distinction would 
present administrative problems . 
., Id. at 578 . 
.. See Surrey, Tax Incentives As A Device For Implementing Government Policy: A Com-
parison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 726 (1970) [hereinafter 
cited as Surrey) . 
.. "If we choose government provision or assistance, then dollars must be spent, and 
whether they are dollars forgone through lost tax revenues or dollars spent directly through 
direct expenditures, the effect on tax rates will be the same." Id . 
.. Tax expenditures are defined as the "special provisions of the federal income tax system 
which represent government expenditure made through that system to achieve various social 
and economic objectives." Id. at 706. 
II By definition, the only tax expenditures not properly labeled tax incentives are those 
"related to involuntary activities." Id. at 712. Thus, I.R.C. § 151(d), the additional exemption 
for the blind, is not a tax incentive . 
.. See Surrey, supra note 88, at 713; McDaniel & Kaplinsky, The Use of The Federal 
Income Tax System To Combat Air And Water Pollution: A Case Study In Tax Expenditures, 
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§ 2006 must be examined not only as a direct recycling incentive, 
but also as an income tax expenditure provision. Only in such a 
manner can the efficacy of the measure be fully evaluated and its 
effects within the tax system properly discussed. 93 
Section 2006 must be examined with three inquiries. First, will 
the tax credit stimulate appreciable increases in materials recy-
cling? Second, will it effectively offset market inequities caused by 
existing tax subsidies allowed for virgin materials use? Finally, in 
light of the infirmities of § 2006, are its costs reasonable? 
A. Will the Tax Credit Stimulate an Appreciable Increase in 
Recycling? 
Because tax credits effect a reduction in tax liability, their imme-
diate result is additional cash flow in the hands of the taxpayer. 
Thus, implicit in the offering of § 2006 is the Finance Committee's 
assumption that increased cash flow means increased recycling. A 
presumed reasoning appears: the tax credit will create increased 
cash flow for the taxpayer-recycler; increased cash flow, in turn, 
means increased demand for secondary materials; and finally, in-
creased demand means increased recycling. Notwithstanding this 
logic, additional cash flow does not guarantee increased recycling. 
A fundamental defect in § 2006 results from a failure to account 
for the supply and demand elasticities of the secondary materials 
market. During testimony before the Finance Committee, Senator 
Hart, an opponent of the measure, pointed out the long-run supply 
and demand price inelasticity of many recyclable materials. 94 Re-
cent econometric studies of the secondary materials market support 
this conclusion; estimating, for example, a long-run supply and 
demand elasticity for wastepaper of only 0.16.95 In other words, nei-
1 ENV. AFr. 1, 17-18 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McDaniel & Kaplinsky]; McDaniel, 
Alternatives To Utilization of The Federallncome Tax System To Meet Social Problems, 11 
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 867, 870 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McDaniel, Alternatives]. 
,3 For a similar analytical approach see McDaniel & Kaplinsky, supra note 92; McDaniel, 
Alternatives, supra note 92 . 
.. FINANCE COMM. TESTIMONY, supra note 43, at 18 (statement of Sen. G. Hart). Accord, 
Anderson & Spiegelman, supra note 13, at 19-22. 
Elasticity of demand, "is the ratio of the percentage reduction in quantity purchased to 
the percentage price increase that induced it." SUITS, PRINCIPLES or ECONOMICS 278 (1970). 
Elasticity of supply, on the other hand, is "the ratio of a percentage increase in quantity to 
the percentage increase in price that induced it." ld. at 317 . 
.. Anderson & Spiegelman, supra note 13, at 19-20. Econometric analysis is a computerized 
method of inductive economic forecasting. SUITS, PRINCIPLES or ECONOMICS 206 (1970). 
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ther the long-run supply of, nor the long-run demand for these mate-
rials will be appreciably increased by simply raising or lowering the 
price offered or demanded for the scrap.9o Senator Hart suggested 
that this inelasticity results from the high, fixed costs of municipal 
waste management which "often far exceed the market price" of-
fered for the materials by industry.97 Moreover, public demand for 
products manufactured from secondary materials could be limited 
by traditional preferences for new and unused consumer goods.98 
Consequently, industrial demand for secondary materials might 
likewise be reduced. 
Although the extent to which market inelasticities would lessen 
the effect of § 2006 is uncertain, two recent studies indicate that the 
tax credit's impact on recycling activities would be minimal. A 
Treasury study predicted increased wastepaper, scrap iron, and 
scrap copper recycling of less than 1% while aluminum recycling 
would increase by just over that amount." A second study antici-
pated slightly larger increments: wastepaper recycling up by 1.6%; 
scrap iron and steel recycling up by 3%; and scrap copper recycling 
up by just over 3%.100 Thus, § 2006 is not expected to substantially 
increase recycling efforts. 
Members of the Senate were opposed to the tax credit for three 
reasons. Senate spokemen expressed concern for the high costlOI and 
the predicted minimal benefit of § 2006.102 Yet, the most prominent 
criticism scored the probability of a tax windfall to recyclers.103 
Several factors justified the senators' fear of a windfall to the 
recycling industry. Industry itself criticized § 2006 as "an unwar-
ranted drain upon the United States Treasury without commensur-
" This is not the case for all recyclable materials, however. For example, the long-run 
supply price elasticity of scrap steel is estimated at 1.12. Anderson & Spiegelman, supra note 
13, at 21. 
17 FINANCE COMM. TESTIMONY, supra note 43, at 18. (statement of Sen. G. Hart) . 
• M Cf. [1976] 7 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 895 (discussing the need for greater public confidence 
in wastewater reuse). 
II See 122 CONGo REc. S13410 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (remarks of Sen. G. Hart). 
'" See Anderson, Public Policies, supra note 45, at 8. Note, however, that Anderson's study 
assumed profit margins, "large enough to support the full deduction. To the extent profit 
margins fall short of that ... , the estimated impact on recycling would be reduced." [d. 
,., See 122 CONGo REc. S13409 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (remarks of Sen. G. Hart); id. at 
S13412 (remarks of Sen. Durkin); id. at S13413 (remarks of Sen. Dole). 
'02 See id. at S13410 (remarks of Sen. G. Hart); id. at S13412 (remarks of Sen. Durkin); 
id. at S13413 (remarks of Sen. Dole). 
"' See id. at S13409-10 (remarks of Sen. G. Hart); id. at S13412 (remarks of Sen. Durkin). 
It has been suggested that the fear of a tax windfall to recyclers led to the defeat of the 
measure. See [1976] 7 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 894. 
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ate benefits and an unwanted windfall to ... industry."104 Industry 
further argued that the tax credit would effect a misallocation of 
revenue without increasing recycling because it would "result only 
in increased prices for scrap."105 That is, rather than stimulating 
increased scrap purchasing, the additional cash flow within the 
market would simply inflate the price demanded by the suppliers 
of scrap. Thus, § 2006 suffers an inherent infirmity in its lack of 
control over, and regulation of the supply-side of the market equa-
tion. lOO While this absence of supply-side regulation is characteristic 
of demand-side tax credits as a whole, two additional objections 
were cited which relate solely to drafting deficiencies of this particu-
lar bill. 
Senator Humphrey, in opposing the measure, emphasized a 
major drafting defect in the § 2006 credit formula. l07 The credit 
formula actually permits a tax benefit even if the taxpayer-recycler 
fails to increase secondary materials consumption. For example, a 
plastics recycler would be allowed a 5% credit against all purchases 
above the applicable base period amount.108 If, in year four the 
recycler purchases only 80% of the base period amount, that is, he 
purchases less than the past three-year average, the credit neverthe-
less applies to 5% of his year four purchases. Consequently, there is 
no guarantee of any increased recycling. Only if the credit is limited 
to purchases in excess of 100% of past average purchases will the 
benefit be concentrated on additional recycling efforts. 
Another defect in § 2006 results from the provision's definition of 
eligible solid waste materials. 109 As previously noted, industrial fab-
rication wastes are included within this definition;IIO yet, these 
wastes currently enjoy a recycling rate of nearly 90%. I I I Again the 
potential for a windfall is tremendous. Senator Hart criticized this 
anomaly, arguing that prompt scraps would receive a major benefit, 
while post-consumer wastes "will continue to be so prohibitively 
, •• 122 CONGo REC. S13412 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (Sen. Durkin quoting the Aluminum 
Recyclers Association). 
, •• FINANCE COMM. TESTIMONY, supra note 43, at 159 (statement of Daniel M. Moenich, 
President, Aluminum Recyclers Association). 
, .. Note the approach of the product charge to this problem in text at notes 173-84, infra. 
10' 122 CONGo REc. S13410 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
10' SENATE FINANCE § 2006, supra note 7, at § 2006(g)(2)(C). 
II~ See text at note 84, supra; 122 CONGo REC. S13410 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (remarks of 
Sen. G. Hart). 
'"I See note 85, supra. 
'" See text at note 16, supra. 
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expensive that little increased recycling will result." 112 If the goal of 
the tax credit is to increase recycling then only those materials not 
now economically recycled should be included. A narrowing of § 
2006's scope would ensure maximum impact upon the real target of 
post-consumer municipal wastes. 
As a market incentive, tax credits suffer a further defect unrelated 
to the windfall problem, yet bearing on their efficiency as recycling 
stimulants. Because tax credits represent substantive federal assis-
tance programs administered through the income tax system, their 
scope is necessarily limited to that of the tax system. The tax credit, 
therefore, cannot stimulate the desired result outside of that sys-
tem. For example, § 2006 would offer no incentive to the recycler 
just starting out and suffering initial losses. 1I3 In such a case, the 
recycler would not owe federal income taxes; thus a tax credit would 
be of no benefit to him. A commentator has termed this the "upside 
down effect" of tax incentives, as those most in need of assistance 
usually receive the least benefit.114 To remedy this problem Congress 
could remove the substantive program from the framework of the 
tax system and convert it into a direct recycling subsidy program.1I5 
While critics argued the probable inefficiency of § 2006 as a mar-
ket incentive, proponents of the measure answered that the credit 
would offset the market inequities caused by current tax subsidies 
allowed virgin materials. 
B. Will the Tax Credit Offset Market Inequities Caused by 
Present Tax Subsidies for Virgin Material Use? 
In support of § 2006, Senator Gravel argued that existing tax 
subsidies allowed for virgin material use tend to hold the recycling 
industry "behind the power curve." 116 That is, these tax provisions117 
actually prevent recycling efforts that might otherwise be pursued. 
Recent econometric studies support this proposition. liS Analysis 
indicates, for example, that the capital gains treatment of standing 
112 FINANCE COMM. TESTIMONY, supra note 43, at 19. (statement of Sen. G. Hart). 
11:1 Cf. McDaniel & Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 19 (similar criticism ofLR.C. § 169 - rapid 
amortization of pollution control facilities). 
'" Id. 
'" An extended discussion of potential direct assistance programs is beyond the scope of 
this work. 
'" 122 CONGo REC. S13411 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Gravel). 
117 Herein, percentage depletion allowances and capital gains treatment of standing timber 
profits. See notes 41-42, supra. 
11K E.L.I. Study, supra note 40, at 10042. 
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tim ber profits has decreased the price of pulpwood by 1 % to 4%.119 
Percentage depletion allowances are estimated to have reduced the 
prices of raw copper and lead by 6% to 7%, steel prices by 3%, and 
aluminum prices by 1% to 2%.120 By reducing the industrial con-
sumption cost of virgin materials, these tax subsidies limit the 
quantity of secondary materials that might otherwise be consumed. 
Research indicates that these subsidies have resulted in a long-run 
reduction in wastepaper recycling of 1.5%, aluminum recycling of 
1.7%, and steel recycling of 3% to 6%.121 Thus, to the extent that the 
policy of subsidizing the exploitation of virgin resources acts as an 
incentive for the consumption of virgin materials, it is also a disin-
centive to increased recycling efforts by industry. 
The dilemma submits to two solutions: either current tax incen-
tives for virgin materials use should be eliminated, or a separate set 
of incentives should be added. Section 2006 takes the latter resolve. 
Proponents of the tax credit, however, offered little evidence of the 
degree of offset to be expected. In fact, quantitative analysis of the 
hypothesis is not available. Nevertheless, a speculated correlation 
of the predicted increases in recyclingl22 with the estimated hold-
back percentagesl23 suggests that some offset, or balancing, might 
occur .124 A tax credit to recyclers, then, could partially offset market 
distortions caused by the current tax subsidies for virgin materials 
consumption, but the extent of the offset is uncertain. 
On the other hand, there is strong support for the abolition of both 
depletion allowancesl25 and capital gains treatment of standing tim-
ber profits. 128 Indeed, from the viewpoint of either resource conserva-
tion or tax reform, such abolition is long overdue. 127 Depletion allow-
"' Id. at 10041. 
'211 Id. at 10041-42. 
12' Id. at 10042. 
'22 See text at note 99, supra. 
123 See text at note 121, supra. 
'" In the case of wastepaper, the Anderson study forecast resultant recycling up by 1.6%, 
while the Treasury study predicted a less than 1% increase. See text at notes 111-14, supra. 
If the hold-back due to capital gains treatment is 1.5%, then there could be a partial offset. 
See text at note 121, supra. A similar correlation for scrap steel indicates a lesser setoff. 
'25 "Rather than extend income tax subsidies to recyclers the existing tax subsidies for 
virgin material production should be eliminated if one is interested in promoting efficiency 
in the allocation of factors of production." Anderson, Public Policies, supra note 45, at 3. 
,,, See Skinner, supra note 45; Crown, Percentage Depletion Still An Issue, [1975] TAX 
NOTES No. 111, 30 [hereinafter cited as Crown]. 
'%7 See Skinner, supra note 45; cf. McDaniel, Alternatives, supra note 92 (reviewing the 
various infirmities of tax expenditures generally). 
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ances and capital gains treatment of standing timber profits are 
generally criticized for their inability to effect a desired result equi-
tably among the selected group of taxpayers.128 These preferences 
contribute needless complexity to the tax system. In sum, opposi-
tion to these tax subsidies is vehement and the cure lies in their 
elimination rather than in the adoption of a new and opposing set 
of subsidies for secondary materials. 
C. Are the Costs of the Tax Credit Reasonable? 
The Treasury prediction that § 2006 would increase materials 
recycling approximately 1%,129 prompts a cost-benefit considera-
tion. What is the reasonable social cost of a 1% increase in 
recycling? The Senate opposition declared that the projected cost 
of $345 million per year was clearly excessive. 130 This conclusion, 
coupled with the likelihood of a tax windfall to recyclers, justified 
the defeat of § 2006. 131 The substantive problem remains, however. 
Millions of tons of recoverable post-consumer wastes are unrecov-
ered because of financial and marketing constraints. The product 
charge is an alternative approach to the problem. Unlike § 2006, the 
product charge considers the necessary roles of waste reduction as 
well as recycling in a national materials policy. 
IV. THE PRODUCT CHARGE: SECTION 306 
In December of 1975, the House Commerce Committee submitted 
for comment its draft of proposed § 306 of the Solid Waste Utiliza-
tion Act. 132 Implicit in the measure was the Committee's resolution 
to establish both an incentive for recycling and waste reduction and 
a disincentive for virgin materials consumption.133 Section 306 
"" See Crown, supra note 126. For similar criticism of other tax expenditures, see generally 
Surrey, supra note 88; McDaniel & Kaplinsky, supra note 92; McDaniel, Alternatives, supra 
note 92; [1977) 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1351-53. A detailed discussion of the many criticisms 
of tax incentives is beyond the scope of the present work. 
121 See text at note 99, supra. 
130 See 122 CONGo REc. S13409 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (remarks of Sen. G. Hart); id. at 
S13412 (remarks of Sen. Durkin). 
131 [1976) 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 894. By a vote of 36 to 34, § 2006 was amended to demand 
additional study of tax credits for recycling. 122 CONGo REc. S13414 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976) (voice vote). 
\32 Draft § 306, supra note 8. 
\33 "The objective of such [product) charges is to provide incentives at the producer level 
to redesign products to reduce solid waste management costs (e.g., use less material or lighter 
material) and to provide incentives at the consumer level to reduce consumption." EPA, 
SECOND REPORT, supra note 24, at 109. 
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would have levied "a charge on the sale or transfer at the bulk 
production level of rigid consumer containers, flexible consumer 
packaging, and paper."134 This charge would then be reduced "by a 
percentage equal to the percentage of secondary materials contained 
in the product."135 Thus the product charge resembles an excise tax 
on consumer packaging and paper products administered at the 
point of bulk manufacture or sale. 136 Although neither hearings nor 
a floor vote were allowed on § 306, congressional interest in the 
product charge generally remains strong.137 Pursuant to the man-
date of the recently enacted Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976, an eighteen month study of the approach is now under 
way.13S 
The charge levied on a manufacturer depends on the type and 
quantity of materials integrated into his product. 13D Paper and flexi-
ble consumer packaging manufacturers are charged on a weight 
basis ($26 per ton), while manufacturers ofrigid consumer contain-
ers are charged on a unit basis ($5 per thousand) .140 These charge 
bases are intended to approximate the current costs of waste collec-
tion and disposal for each product categoryl4l and are subject to 
congressional revision whenever deemed necessary.142 
Once the charge basis is calculated, the reduction formula is ap-
plied. Thus, manufacturers can reduce charge liability to the extent 
of secondary materials substitution. Further, and only in the case 
of flexible consumer packaging and paper products, charge liability 
'" Draft § 306, supra note 8, at § 306(b)(1)(B)(i). 
(35 [d. § 306(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
(3' OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
FOURTH REPORT To CONGRESS - RESOURCE RECOVERY AND WASTE REDUCTION, 7-1 (draft, Aug., 
1976) [hereinafter cited as EPA, FOURTH REPORT). 
137 See Hearing Before the Panel on Materials Policy of the Subcomm. on Envt'l Pollution 
of the Senate Comm. on Public Works: To Consider the Effects of Product Disposal Charges 
on Municipal Waste Recovery and Reuse, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print, May 20, 1976) 
(hearings on proposed product charge modeled on § 306) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
'3K Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 8002(j)(1)(D), 
90 Stat. 2833 (1976) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6982(j)(1)(D)). 
,3D Section 306 deals only with consumer packaging and paper products; hence, food wastes, 
auto scraps, industrial, and agricultural wastes are excluded. EPA estimates that the in-
cluded products constitute nearly 80% of all product-type wastes and about 1/2 of the total 
municipal waste stream. EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-9. 
". Draft § 306, supra note 8, at § 306(b)(1)(B)(i). 
'41 In 1974, "direct costs of collecting, processing, and land filling averaged about $26 per 
ton." EPA, FOURTH REPORT, supra note 136, at 7-9. Rigid containers, because of differing 
weight to volume ratios are better charged on a volume basis. See id. at 7-10 to 7-11. 
'" Draft § 306, supra note 8, at § 306(b)(1)(D). 
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is lessened to the extent that product design modification results in 
less weight.143 In an attempt to minimize economic disruption § 306 
was to be phased in over a ten year period: 144 no charge would be 
imposed during the initial year of enactment, and thereafter the 
charge would be implemented in 10% per year increments. 145 
Section 306 also included a temporary recycling subsidy calcu-
lated, like the charge reduction formula, on the percentage of post 
consumer "secondary material utilized as a constituent in [the] 
product."u6 Unlike the charge mechanism, however, the recycling 
subsidy was to be phased out over the initial ten year period. 1H The 
subsidy was to proceed as a direct grant to manufacturers and was 
intended to further reduce the initial economic disruption caused by 
the charge. 
An illustration will clarify the operation of § 306. Assume a manu-
facturer of aluminum beverage containers with an output of 1000 
cans per year in years one and two. Further, assume no recycling in 
year one, but a switch to 25% secondary material in year two. The 
charge for either year is $5 ($5 per thousand), but in year two the 
charge is reduced by 25% because of the switch. The phase in provi-
sion reduces the year one charge to $0, and the year two charge to 
38 cents (10% of $3.75). Further, in year two the manufacturer is 
allowed a recycling subsidy of $1.13 (90% of $1.25).148 Note, however, 
that the phase in provision and the recycling subsidy are in effect 
only during the first ten years of § 306's implementation. 
Another innovation of § 306 was the establishment of an "Envi-
ronmental Quality Assistance Fund, "149 which was to act as a reposi-
tory for revenue collected through the charge, thus providing a 
source of funds for both administrative costs and recycling subsidy 
payments to manufacturers. 15o Excess revenue was to be transferred 
to municipalities on a quasi-per capita basis. 151 In addition, the 
Administrator was to establish "guidelines for municipalities re-
'" See id. § 306(b)(1)(B)(i),(iii) . 
... [d. § 306(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
'45 [d. 
'" [d. § 306(d)(1). 
'" [d. 
'" As a result, the manufacturer has a year two net payment of 75 cents. At some time in 
the future, however, the charge liability will exceed the recycling subsidy granted due to the 
phase out provision . 
.. , Draft § 306, supra note 8, at § 306(e)(1). 
'50 [d. § 306(e)(2)-(4). 
15' [d. § 306(e)(5). 
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ceiving funds under this section that . . . [would] insure efficient 
and environmentally sound solid waste management practices."152 
The EPA has cited two primary functions served by the product 
charge. First, the charge should significantly stimulate recycling 
and waste reduction efforts because it provides a strong incentive 
for manufacturers and consumers to modify their "market decisions 
affecting solid waste."153 Second, the charge should offer needed 
financial assistance to local waste management agencies for their 
solid waste problems.154 The following discussion will analyze these 
assertions, and evaluate the efficacy of the product charge in light 
of its administrative and consumer costs. 
A. Will the Product Charge Stimulate a Substantial Increase in 
Recycling and Waste Reduction Efforts? 
The fundamental premise of the product charge assumes that 
virgin material prices "do not reflect the full cost of environmental 
degradation the materials create."155 Due to the widespread policy 
of financing municipal waste management through the general tax 
system,158 virgin material prices fail to account for the future costs 
of waste collection and disposal attending their consumption. 157 As 
a cost allocation technique, the product charge simulates these costs 
and forces them into the price of the consumer commodity .158 Hence, 
the cost of financing municipal waste management effectively shifts 
to those whose market decisions determine the volume of the munic-
ipal waste stream. 150 In theory, manufacturers and consumers would 
minimize price inflation by altering their respective market transac-
tions. 180 Manufacturers can modify product design and composition 
choices, and consumers can alter their selection of products. 161 
But will § 306 actually cause industry to increase recycling and 
1>' [d. § 306(e)(6). 
'113 EPA, FOURTH REPORT, supra note 136, at 7-1. 
'" [d. 
'" EPA, FIRST REpORT, supra note 9, at 55. 
, .. See text at note 45, supra. 
'" [d . 
.. " EPA, SECOND REPORT, supra note 24, at 109. 
, •• See EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-3; Fred Smith, Jr., Policy Analyst, 
Resource Recovery Div., EPA, Wash., D.C., National Solid Waste Disposal Charges (Design 
Draft 2), at 1 (1975) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Smith, Disposal 
Charges). 
110 EPA, SECOND REPORT, supra note 24, at 109. 
"' [d. 
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waste reduction? The deficiencies of the tax credit approach teach 
that to be effective, a measure designed to stimulate the secondary 
materials market must affect the entire market equation; to be 
successful, the product charge must stimulate both demand and 
supply. 
Three features of § 306 promise increased demand for secondary 
materials: the base charge provision, the charge reduction formula, 
and the temporary recycling subsidy. Under this scheme, the manu-
facturer has two means of reducing charge liability: either reduce 
materials content altogether (a waste reduction effort) or substitute 
recycled materials during fabrication (a recycling effort). Current 
studies predict impressive recycling increases in response to the 
adoption of a product charge. 162 Preliminary results from these EPA 
studies estimate that a product charge levied on paper and con-
sumer packaging products would reduce virgin packaging material 
consumption by approximately 8.6 million tons per year, with in-
creased recycling accounting for nearly 92% of that total, and 
greater waste reduction for the remainder.163 
If these predictions are correct, the § 306 product charge would 
result in dramatic increases in secondary materials use. 164 Because 
the charge effectively increases the cost of virgin materials, the rela-
tive cost of secondary materials decreases. 165 
Moreover, there are reasons why these [EPA] estimates may even un-
derstate the recycling increase. First, no consideration was given to the 
supply-side stimulus that the transfer of revenues to local governments 
for waste management purposes would undoubtedly trigger. Second, no 
consideration was given to the induced technological changes ... that 
would result from the increased profitability of recycling. ISS 
Unlike the product charge studied by the EPA, § 306 includes a 
temporary recycling subsidy.167 To the manufacturer who must 
readjust supply and production technologies, this subsidy is an ad-
'" EPA, FOURTH REPORT, supra note 136, at 7-23. Note that the charge studied by the EPA 
is similar to that proposed in § 306, but does not include a temporary recycling subsidy. 
'" [d. These results are derived from works in progress, and should therefore be viewed as 
preliminary. 
lA' "A major effect of this adjustment procedure will be the creation of a strong recycling 
incentive; each ton of input materials supplied from secondary sources would save the estab-
lishment $26." Smith, Disposal Charges, supra note 159, at 3. 
'" EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-21. 
'" [d. at 7-27. 
'" Draft § 306, supra note 8, at § 306(d); EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-14,7-
17. 
1976] RECYCLING INCENTIVES 691 
ditional stimulus to recycle, and should further increase demand for 
secondary materials. '68 Nevertheless, certain proponents of the 
product charge question the necessity of the temporary subsidy."HI 
At least two environmental groups argue that the subsidy could 
even discourage waste reduction efforts. 170 Thus, the dispute centers 
not on the efficacy of the product charge, but rather on the proper 
balance to be struck between recycling and waste reduction incen-
tives. '71 
Section 306, in sum, contains several secondary material demand 
incentives. The following discussion will focus on the supply incen-
tives of the product charge. 
B. Will the Product Charge Prove Effective in Assisting Local 
Waste Management Agencies? 
Under the § 306 product charge all funds in excess of amounts 
necessary for administration and subsidy costs were to be trans-
ferred to municipalities on a quasi-per capita basis from the Envi-
ronmental Quality Assistance Fund.172 After the ten year transi-
tional period, most, if not all, of the revenue raised through the 
product charge would be directed to municipal government.17:l Thus, 
by the late 1980's, § 306 could provide local government with nearly 
"half of all solid waste management costs," or up to $1 million 
annually for a city of 100,000.174 On the other hand, § 306 does not 
expressly require that this revenue be used solely for waste manage-
ment. Federal "guidelines" could specify such a restriction, but 
they may not be binding on local decision making. m 
'" C(. Hearings, supra note 137, at 65 (statement of purpose of proposed product charge 
modeled on § 306). 
'" See Hearings, supra note 137, at 55 (testimony of Brock Evans, Director, The Sierra 
Club, Wash., D.C. Office); id. at 57 (testimony of Blakeman Early, Spokesperson, 
Environmental Action). 
1711 Id. at 55, 57. 
'71 For example, the reuse of all glass beverage containers could reduce domestic energy 
consumption by approximately 218 trillion BTU of energy per year. EPA, THIRD REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 23. Actual glass recycling, however, could not hope to attain such large energy 
savings. 
172 Draft § 306, supra note 8, at § 306(e)(5). 
17:1 Note, by this time the subsidy program will no longer be in effect. 
'" EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-34. 
In Even if local government chooses to channel funds into other social programs, the 
municiPlll tax base could still be lightened to the extent of revenues received. "Moreover 
every individual is a member of some local jurisdiction and- would benefit from the revenue 
transfer, either through a reduced tax burden or through continued or even increased govern-
mental services." Id. at 7-13. 
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If the product charge proposes to stimulate supply-side activity, 
municipal receipt of the transferred revenue should be conditioned 
on application of the funds to waste management programs. 176 
Should this revenue remain earmarked for solid waste purposes, 
then § 306 would "trigger" a stronger supply technology response. 177 
Nor will supply activity be limited by inadequate capacity. The 
National Association of Recycling Industries reports that 
"production of secondary materials could be doubled."17R Further, 
increased competition between virgin and secondary materials will 
give rise to even greater income to municipal waste management 
agencies through additional industrial purchasing. 179 Thus, as long 
as the municipality's receipt of transfer revenue is conditioned upon 
its improving waste management practices, § 306 will prove effec-
tive in assisting local waste management. 
In comparison with the tax credit, § 306 shows greater promise as 
a recycling stimulant primarily because it focuses on both supply 
and demand, and once fully implemented, it functions as a self-
supporting system. Further, § 306 promises greater fiscal regulation 
of the secondary materials market, provided that municipalities 
receiving the funds follow the federal guidelines. IRo While the tax 
credit would require large federal expenditures, § 306 creates its own 
funding without recourse to the Treasury. The product charge, how-
ever, does not offer a free ride to society; both industry and the 
consuming public must bear its substantial cost. 
C. Are the Administrative and Consumer Costs of the Product 
Charge Reasonable? 
As previously noted, § 306 resembles certain special excise taxes 
levied at the point of bulk sale or transfer .IRI If it is to be effective 
as a market incentive, the product charge must be relatively simple 
to administer. Because § 306 is imposed upon only a select group of 
products,IR2 the number of manufacturers requiring supervision is 
small. 1M3 Comparative evaluations suggest that the product charge 
178 [d. at 7·18. 
171 See text at note 166, supra. 
17K EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-21 to 7-22. 
17' See text at note 164, supra. 
IKO See text at note 175, supra. 
IKI See note 136, supra. 
1K2 See note 139, supra. 
IlLl EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-19. The EPA estimates that only 9,240 
establishments need to be monitored for the successful administration of a product charge 
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is neither more complex nor more difficult to collect than present 
excise taxes. IK~ Indeed, collection costs are projected as "moderate 
- certainly not in excess of 1 percent of gross yield," and probably 
half that amount.IKS Thus, in comparison to other federal programs 
of similar structure, § 306 is relatively simple to administer. 
Consumer groups may be concerned with the eventual consumer 
price inflation that would attend the adoption of a product charge. 
Undoubtedly a materials charge levied at any point of product man-
ufacture will increase the ultimate product price"H6 Yet, the in-
creased product price reflects the true costs of the product's con-
sumption and supports a major goal of the product charge approach, 
which is to alter societal consumption patterns. IK7 To the extent that 
manufacturing costs are reduced by recycling, consumer prices can 
be lowered, and consumer market decisions can be adjusted. 
The EPA anticipates a "uniformly small" increase in consumer 
expenses resulting from a product charge on consumer packaging 
and paper products. IKK On a per capita basis the predicted increase 
is estimated to average only $5 to $6 per year"K9 The per family 
effect should vary from approximately $5 to $30 per year, depending 
on family income before taxes.IUO Consumer product prices are pre-
dicted to increase an average of 0.3%, with heavily packaged prod-
ucts, such as most canned goods, experiencing the largest increases, 
and fresh foods, the smallest increases. lUI 
Although the overall price impact is minimal, the charge itself 
will be regressive. 192 Thus, it will place a greater burden on lower 
income groups, as is the case with most pollution control programs, 
"since pollution is highly correlated with material consumption 
which is also regressive."193 Notwithstanding the regressive effect of 
on consumer packaging and paper products. [d. at 7-20. 
,., These are: (1) I.R.C. §§ 4081, 91, gasoline and oil taxes for highway maintenance; (2) 
I.R.C. § 4161, sporting goods taxes for fish and wildlife conservation; and (3) I.R.C. § 4041(c), 
airplane fuel taxes for airport maintenance. EPA, Fourth Report, supra note 136, at 7-18. 
, .. [d. at 7-21, quoting Slitor, Administrative Aspects of a Dedicated Manufacturer's Excise 
Tax on Solid Waste Creating Products (contract study for EPA). 
, •• See EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-17; Fred Smith, Jr., Economist, Resource 
Recovery Division, EPA, Wash., D.C., Product Charge: Concept and Comments 2 (undated). 
(unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Smith]. 
'" See text at note 61, supra. 
, .. EPA, FOURTH REpORT, supra note 136, at 7-27. 
, •• Smith, supra note 186, at 5. 
'10 EPA, FOURTH REPORT, supra note 136, at 7-30. 
'" [d. at 7-28. 
'" Smith, supra note 186, at 6-7; EPA, FOURTH REPORT, supra note 136, at 7-33. 
113 EPA, FOURTH REPORT, supra note 136, at 7-33 (unnumbered footnote). 
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§ 306, the EPA suggests that as long as transferred revenues "are 
used to reduce taxes or to increase or maintain services," the undue 
burden on lower income groups may be mitigated. 194 Thus, regressiv-
ity must be considered not only in the design of a product charge, 
but also in the promulgation of regulations or guidelines pursuant 
to a transfer of funds provision. 195 
D. Is the Product Charge an Efficient Market Incentive for 
Recycling? 
As a market incentive § 306 offers several advantages over the tax 
credit approach. First, the product charge channels cash flow to 
both the supply- and demand-sides of the materials market. Sec-
ond, the product charge forces an early recognition of the waste 
management costs of materials consumption, thus providing a 
strong incentive for industry and the consuming public to modify 
their consumption patterns. Third, the transfer of funds provision 
offers an effective funding source for local solid waste management 
efforts. And finally, the product charge may well result in a substan-
tial increase in materials recycling. As a waste reduction technique, 
the product charge may have less dramatic results. IDS Yet over the 
long run, the charge will provide an incentive for producers to alter 
their product design specifications and to strive for less materials-
intensive practices. ID7 
The predicted administrative and consumer costs resulting from 
the charge are not unreasonable. Despite the slightly regressive as-
pects of a charge based on materials consumption, the net income 
effect of the measure is minimal when compared to the benefits to 
be derived. And as Senator Gravel argued in support of the tax 
credit, "[t]he benefits are simple .... [W]e are going to begin, 
'"~ [d. at 7-33. 
Little data exists on the breakdown of local governmental services by income group; 
however, it is likely that the financial pressures of increased solid waste management costs 
have resulted in curtailment in social services. The impact of such reductions is, of course, 
highly regressive. Thus, not only are the initial costs of the charge low on an absolute 
basis; but also the revenue transfer feature will most likely reduce the initial regressive 
impact on lower income groups. [d. 
,,, See Smith, supra note 186, at 7. Mr. Smith suggests that one solution might be to 
earmark a portion of the revenue for food stamp or other redistribution programs. 
II. See EPA, FOURTH REPORT, supra note 136, at 7-23. 
"' Cf, Smith, supra note 186, at 2 (analogy drawn to reduced newsprint consumption 
following a comparable price increase). 
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for the first time in this country, to reorient the country so that we 
save the stuff that we have been burying."t98 
V. CONCLUSION 
Materials recycling and waste reduction are just two of many 
waste management techniques. If properly administered, they will 
invaluably contribute to resource conservation, but they are not 
panaceas. The complexity of effective solid waste management mili-
tates against adopting any single approach. While the product 
charge should result in significant recycling increases, it will not 
resolve other immediate problems such as: reducing the high cost 
of municipal waste collection, reducing or readjusting transporta-
tion costs for secondary materials, assisting rural areas in their solid 
waste problems, and abolishing anachronistic tax benefits that only 
hamper additional recycling efforts. Each of these dilemmas re-
quires close examination and analysis before action is taken. 
Moreover, the product charge is a complex legislative design. For 
some wastes it promises to be an efficient market incentive, but for 
others, such as glass beverage containers, it may prove less effective 
than different waste reduction techniques. The studies cited in this 
article suggest, however, that the product charge should become an 
integral part of a developing national materials policy. The 95th 
Congress must now determine what market incentives, if any, they 
will use to stimulate the secondary materials market. 
"' 122 CONGo REc. 813411 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1976). 
